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Abstract
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation
invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine
how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption
affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical
auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent
corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auc-
tion houses.
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1. introduction
Whenever people face scarcity, some may be tempted to cheat. This is true
for ordinary thieves as well as for bidders in an auction for a government
construction job, or for those who compete for the right to host the Olympic
games. In this paper we study corruption, as a special form of cheating in
auctions.
Corruption is generally defined as the “misuse of a position of trust for dis-
honest gain.” In an auction context, corruption refers to the lack of integrity
of the auctioneer. It occurs whenever the auctioneer twists the auction rules
in favor of some bidder(s), in exchange for bribes. Corruption may be a sim-
ple bilateral affair between one bidder and the auctioneer, but it may also
involve collusion among several bidders who jointly strike a deal with the
auctioneer.
Corruption is a frequently observed and well documented event in many gov-
ernment procurement auctions. For example, the bidding for the construc-
tion of a new metropolitan airport in the Berlin area was recently reopened
after investigators found out that Hochtief AG, the winner of the auction, had
illegally acquired the application documents of the rival bidder IVG.1 As an-
other example, in 1996 the authorities of Singapur ruled to exclude Siemens
AG from all public procurements for a period of five years after they deter-
mined that Siemens had bribed Choy Hon Tim, the chief executive of Singa-
pur’s public utility corporation PUB, in exchange for supplying Siemens with
information about rival bids for a major power station construction project.2
Of course, corruption in an auction cannot occur if the seller is also the auc-
tioneer. Corruption is only an issue if the auctioneer is the agent of the seller.
Such delegation occurs if the seller lacks the expertise to run the auction him-
self, or if the seller is a complex organization like the collective of citizens
1See Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1999.
2See Berliner Zeitung, Feb. 2, 1996.
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of a community, a state, or an entire nation. It does not matter whether the
auctioneer-agent is a specialized auction house or a government employee.
What matters alone is the fact that the auctioneer acts independently on be-
half of the seller.
Corruption can also not work in an open-bid auction simply because it lacks
secrecy. However, open auctions may not be feasible if the bids are compli-
cated documents, as is the case of auctions for major construction jobs or
for the right to host the Olympics. In such auctions sealed-bids seems to
be the only feasible auction form. The fact that bids are sealed supplies the
secrecy needed for corrupt games being played between the auctioneer and
one or several bidders.
Given the quantitative importance of auctions and the temptation of corrup-
tion, three questions emerge. Are the usual sealed-bid auctions that are used
for procurement vulnerable to corruption? Is corruption harmful in an effi-
ciency sense? Can we make auctions corruption-proof? We will show that
the answers to these questions are Yes, Maybe, and Yes. Standard sealed-
bid auctions are indeed vulnerable to corruption, corruption may be socially
inefficient, but fortunately there are ways to make auctions corruption-proof.
We also show that corruption has important distributional effects. Specifi-
cally, if the number of bidders is sufficiently large, bidders’ expected equilib-
rium payoffs are unaffected by the possibility of corruption — a consequence
of the revenue equivalence principle. However, there is a transfer of wealth
from the seller to the agent who acts as auctioneer. Moreover, the seller also
bears the cost of the whole expected punishment.
Furthermore, we find that revenue equivalence breaks down if widespread
corruption schemes that involve all bidders are feasible. In that case, corrup-
tion also involves a transfer of expected payoffs from the seller to bidders.
This case is interesting because it is congruent to other examples of break-
down of revenue equivalence studied in the literature, such as the analysis
2
of collusive auction rings by Graham and Marshall (1987), of the breaking-up
of partnerships (see Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987)), and of the
so-called Amish auctions (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994)).
2. structure of the game
There is one seller of a single good who faces n risk neutral potential buy-
ers. The seller has hired an auctioneer to run either a sealed-bid first-price
or a sealed-bid second-price auction. From the auctioneer’s perspective bid-
ders’ valuations are iid random variables. Therefore, the auction game is
a standard symmetric independent private values model, which is however
supplemented by a corruption game.
In the sealed-bid first-price auction, the corruption game is as follows: After
bids have been submitted, the auctioneer reveals the second highest bid to
the highest bidder. The auctioneer allows the highest bidder to lower his bid
to the level of the second highest bid, in exchange for a bribe.
In the sealed-bid second-price auction, the corruption game is slightly more
involved: The auctioneer reveals the three highest bids to the highest and
the second highest bidder. The three parties agree on removing the second
highest bid in exchange for side payments.
Corruption is detected with probability δ, in which case the auctioneer pays
a penalty p0, the winning bidder pays a penalty p1, and, if the second highest
bidder is also involved, he pays a penalty p2. The penalty takes the form of a
jail sentence or the like; it is not a payment to the seller. Also, if corruption
is detected, the original bids have to be paid, i.e. b1 in the first-price and b2
in the second-price auction.
After the auction, the price paid is published, in order to make sure that the
auctioneer does not simply ignore the highest or the two highest bidders,
respectively.
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Valuations v1, . . . , vn are independent draws (no affiliation) from the distri-
bution F with support [0,1]. We denote the distribution of the highest val-
uation of n draws with F1, and the distribution of the highest valuation of
n − 1 draws with G1. By the iid assumption, F1 = Fn and G1 = Fn−1. We
denote the joint density of the ith and jth highest valuations of n draws
with fij . b1, . . . , bn denote the bids. W.l.o.g. we order bidders in such a way
that bi á bi+1.
A bidding strategy is a map βi : vi , bi. An equilibrium is a profile of strate-
gies (β1, . . . , βn) such that βi is a best reply for i given the strategies of all
other bidders. An equilibrium is symmetric if all bidders use the same strat-
egy, β1 = · · · = βn.
We denote the equilibrium strategy of the symmetric equilibrium of the first-
and second-price auction with corruption with β1 and β2, respectively. We
call the corresponding auctions in which corruption is not part of the game
the standard first- and second-price auctions, respectively, and denote the
respective symmetric equilibrium bid functions with B1 and B2.3
3. sealed-bid first-price auctions
The surplus from corruption that the auctioneer and the winning bidder can
share is the difference of the winning and the highest losing bid times the
probability of not being detected, minus the expected penalty imposed on
the winning bidder and on the auctioneer if corruption is detected,
S(b1, b2) := (1− δ)(b1 − b2)− δ(p0 + p1). (1)
We assume proportional sharing of this surplus and denote the share re-
ceived by the auctioneer with αS(b1, b2).
3For a survey of the results of the standard first- and second-price auctions without
corruption see McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Wolfstetter (1999, Chapter 8).
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The winning bidder’s payoff if he does not engage in corruption is
un(v1, b1) := v1 − b1,
and if he does engage in corruption his expected payoff is
uc(v1, b1, b2) := un(v1, b1)+ (1−α)S(b1, b2).
Corruption pays if the surplus is positive, i.e. if the following bribe condition
is satisfied,
b1 − b2 > δ(p0 + p1)
1− δ =: γ. (2)
Therefore, corruption occurs if and only if the winning bid exceeds the second
bid by γ or more.
A bidder’s expected payoff, given that all rival bidders play the strategy β1,















Proposition 1 (who wins and who loses) Consider a symmetric equilibrium.
The possibility of corruption does not affect bidders’ expected payoffs, it makes
the auctioneer better off, and the seller worse off. Corruption also causes a
social deadweight loss if the penalty for corruption is a jail sentence; this dead-
weight loss equals the expected disutility of penalties.
Proof: Bidders’ equilibrium payoffs are u∗(v) := u(v,β1(v)). By the En-







G1 is the probability of winning the auction. Evidently, u∗(0) = 0, because
by bidding some b > 0, the zero-valuation bidder might win the auction and
get something which is worthless to him; if he loses the auction, he never
receives a bribe because corruption involves only the winning bidder and the
auctioneer. Therefore, bidders’ equilibrium payoffs are determined by the
allocation rule G1 only, as in the standard auction.
The auctioneer must be weakly better off by the possibility of corruption,
because otherwise he would not participate. Therefore, the seller must be
worse off. Since the allocation rule is unchanged, the expected gain from
trade is unchanged as well. Thus, every expected gain of the auctioneer must
be matched by a corresponding loss of the seller.
There is, however, another source of losses. If corruption occurs there is
a positive probability that someone will be punished. If the penalty takes
the form of “burning utility” (for instance by sending the winner and the
auctioneer to jail), corruption entails a deadweight loss equal to the expected
disutility of the penalty. This loss is borne by the seller alone, in addition to
the transfer from the seller to the auctioneer. 
Altogether, corruption induces bidders to compete for the gain from corrup-
tion by bidding more aggressively to such an extent that they do not benefit
from it. The auctioneer is the only one gaining in expectations, and his gain
is paid for by the seller. The seller, however, pays more than what the auc-
tioneer receives (in expectations), because he also loses the expected value
of the penalties δ(p0 + p1) if the penalties take the form of a jail sentences
(as opposed to payments to the seller). Thus, depending on the from of the
penalties, corruption may reduce social welfare.
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Proposition 2 (corruption makes bidders aggressive) Bidders with suf-
ficiently low valuations bid the same as in the standard first-price auction,
whereas bidders with higher valuations bid more aggressively, but still below
their true valuation. Formally, let v∗ := B−11 (γ), then∀v à v∗ β1(v) = B1(v),
and ∀v > v∗ B1(v) < β1(v) < B2(v).
Proof: (i) “β1(v) = B1(v) for v à v∗.” If b à γ, bidders’ payoff func-
tion (3) reduces to
u(v,b) = (v − b)G1(β−11 (b)).
This is simply the payoff function of the standard first-price auction. Hence,
for sufficiently small valuations, the equilibrium bid function equals B1. This
is true if B1(v) à γ, or equivalently if v à B−11 (γ) =: v∗.
(ii) “β1(v) > B1(v) for v á v∗.” Suppose v > v∗, then we know that
corruption occurs with positive probability. Hence, if bidders would bid as
in the standard first-price auction, β1(v) = B1(v), their expected payment
in the game with corruption would be less than their expected payment in
the standard first-price auction, for otherwise corruption would not pay and
would therefore never occur. But this contradicts revenue equivalence. Thus,
β1(v) > B1(v) for all v > v∗.
(iii) “β1(v) < B2(v).” Assume v > v∗, δ(p0 + p1) = 0 (hence γ = 0), and
α = 0. Then corruption takes place for sure. Moreover, corruption is free
to the winning bidder because he will not be punished, δp1 = 0, and the
auctioneer participates for free, α = 0. In this case, the game is a standard
second-price auction and therefore bidding must be the same, β1(v) = B2(v).
Now consider an increase in the cost of corruption, i.e.δ(p0+p1) > 0 orα > 0.
Since v > v∗ corruption occurs with positive probability, but corruption
is costly. This is consistent with revenue equivalence only if bids are less
aggressive than in the second-price auction, thus β1(v) < B2(v). 
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Clearly if corruption is detected with certainty, δ = 1, corruption never pays
and the game collapses to the ordinary first-price auction. In this case γ = ∞,
or equivalently v∗ = ∞, hence everyone has a valuation smaller than v∗ and
so corruption never occurs in equilibrium. This finding can be strengthened.
Corollary 3 (corruption-free equilibria) All bidders bid as in the stan-
dard first-price auction and corruption does not occur, with certainty, if and
only if δ á B1(1)B1(1)+p0+p1 =: δ∗.
Proof: “If.” If δ á δ∗, then γ á B1(1), hence v∗ = B−11 (γ) á 1, and v à v∗
for all v .
“Only if.” If δ < δ∗, then γ < B1(1), hence v∗ = B−11 (γ) < 1, and, with
positive probability, some bidder has a valuation that exceeds v∗. These
bidders will bid more than in the standard first-price auction and engage in
corruption, with positive probability. 
This result says that one only needs sufficient monitoring (δ∗ à δ à 1), not
perfect monitoring (δ = 1), to rule out corruption.
We conclude that the sealed bid first-price auction is vulnerable to corrup-
tion, that it hurts only the seller, and may give rise to a deadweight loss.
An immediate resolution of this problem is to run an open auction instead.
However, in many circumstances, this may not be feasible, for instance if the
bids are complicated documents, such as bids for major construction jobs
or Olympic games. A sealed-bid second-price, or Vickrey auction, however,
could help. It is not vulnerable to the kind of corruption we have been study-
ing because the winning bidder is supposed to pay the second bid anyway.
To make corruption work in the Vickrey auction requires the second bidder
to be involved in the corruption scheme as well. This is the topic of the next
section.
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4. sealed-bid second-price auctions
The sealed-bid second-price auction is not vulnerable to a corruption scheme
that involves only the auctioneer and the winning bidder because they alone
cannot change the price. They need the collaboration of the second bidder.
Instead of allowing the winning bidder to lower his bid, bidder 2 is bribed
to withdraw or lower his bid. If this scheme succeeds the winning bidder
pays only the third bid. Altogether, this requires the collaboration of three
parties who must share the gain from corruption: the auctioneer, bidder 1,
and bidder 2.
Assume n á 3. The surplus to be shared by the auctioneer and bidders 1 and
2 is equal to
S(b2, b3) := (1− δ)(b2 − b3)− δp̄, (4)
where p̄ := p0 + p1 + p2 and p0, p1, p2 are the penalties imposed upon the
auctioneer and bidders 1 and 2, respectively. Again, we assume proportional
sharing of the surplus and denote the respective shares with α0, α1, α2, with
α0 +α1 +α2 = 1.
Now consider a bidder with valuation v who makes the bid b. If he happens to
win the auction, his payoff is equal tou1n if he does not engage in corruption,
u1n(v1, b2) := v1 − b2,
and equal to u1c if he does engage in corruption
u1c(v1, b2, b3) := u1n(v1, b2)+α1S(b2, b3).
If he loses the auction he may still gain something. Indeed, in the event that
b is the second highest bid and corruption occurs, his payoff is equal to the
bribe he receives,
u2c(b, b3) := α2S(b, b3).
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Corruption pays if the surplus is positive, i.e. if the following bribe condition
is satisfied,
b2 − b3 > δp̄
1− δ =: γ. (5)
In words, corruption occurs only if the second bid exceeds the third bid by
γ or more.



































(b − β2(v3)− γ)f13(v1, v3)dv3dv1.
Proposition 4 (second-price auction) Suppose n á 3. Then Proposition 1
applies also to the second-price auction.
Proof: We only need to show that revenue equivalence applies. Similar to





Therefore, bidders’ equilibrium payoffs are as in the standard auctions if and
only ifu∗(0) = 0. But this follows immediately from (6) becauseβ−12 (β2(0)) =
0, which entails that, for v = 0, (6) is an integral over a null set.
The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 and therefore
omitted. 
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Interestingly the above result does not apply if there are only two bidders. In
this case revenue equivalence is destroyed, and it may happen that a bidder
who stands no chance of winning the auction bids quite aggressively, because
he speculates on earning a bribe for withdrawing his bid, which lowers the
price paid all the way down to zero.
The surplus from corruption simplifies in this case to
S(b2) := (1− δ)b2 − δp̄.















+α2(1− δ)(1− F1(β−12 (b)))(b − γ).
This last term is the expected value of the share of the surplus from corrup-
tion that the losing bidder receives. We will show that, depending upon the
parameters of the game, this last term can upset revenue equivalence.
Proposition 5 (failure of revenue equivalence) Revenue equivalence does
not generally hold if n = 2.





4If n = 2, then G1 = F , but for clarity we stick to the more general notation.
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We now show that in a symmetric equilibrium one may have u∗(0) > 0,
which together with (8) destroys revenue equivalence. Consider the following
counterexample: Let δ = α0 = α1 = 0, α2 = 1, then γ = 0. For v = 0, (7)
becomes
u(0, b) = −
∫ β−12 (b)
0
β2(v2)dG1(v2)+ (1− F1(β−12 (b)))b.
For b < β−12 (1) we have
u(0, b) á − b
∫ β−12 (b)
0
dG1(v2)+ b − bF1(β−12 (b))
= b
[
1−G1(β−12 (b))− F1(β−12 (b))
]
. (9)
It follows immediately thatu(0, b) > 0 for a sufficiently small but strictly pos-
itive bid b. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium one must have u∗(0) > 0.

Remark: There is an interesting analogy between the present failure of rev-
enue equivalence and the auctions with price-proportional benefits to bid-
ders. Examples of such auctions are the Amish auction to settle an indivisi-
ble inheritance among family members (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994), auction
rings that divide the gain from collusion (Graham and Marshall, 1987), and
the breaking-up of partnerships through auctions (Cramton et al., 1987). In
his analysis Engelbrecht-Wiggans establishes that such auctions “unbalance
revenue equivalence.” Just like in the present context, the reason for this re-
sult is that even the player who stands no chance to win the auction collects
some payment. Hence u∗(0) > 0, which implies that bidders’ equilibrium
payoffs u∗(v) are greater than the level reached in standard auctions.
5. more elaborate auctions and corruption schemes
So far we have restricted the analysis of coalitions in corruption schemes to
the smallest possible size, and we restricted the analysis to the two most
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common auction rules. In this section we consider some less common auc-
tions and allow for more elaborate corruption schemes that involve larger
coalitions.
If coalitions involve more bidders, the benefits from corruption can be raised
by further lowering the equilibrium price, yet this gain has to be shared
among more members. Moreover, with each illegal contact between two par-
ties there is a risk of detection. Therefore, the larger the coalition, the more
likely corruption is detected.
A general corruption scheme in a more general auction framework is as fol-
lows: Consider a k-price auction, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which awards the item to
the highest bidder who is asked to pay the k-th highest price. The winning
bidder has the option to offer to bidder i a bribe in exchange for withdrawing
his bid. Let c be the number of bidders participating in the corrupt coalition.
c = 1 means that the corruption scheme involves only the winning bidder
and the auctioneer; c = 5 means that the winner has bribed four other bid-
ders to drop their bids. c = 0 means that the winning bidder does not engage
in corruption. If corruption is not detected, the winning bidder pays bk+c ,
otherwise he pays bk and all involved bidders and the auctioneer are penal-
ized. This more complex corruption scheme is clearly also available in the
first-price auction: Several loosing bidders can be bribed to drop their bids,
and the winning bidder may lower his bid below the original highest losing
bid.
What do we know about the validity of our results if such involved corruption
schemes are available? Proposition 1 goes through if and only if revenue
equivalence holds in these more complicated games as well. However, there
are more constellations where revenue equivalence fails.
As an instructive digression let us study the reasons for the failure of rev-
enue equivalence in Proposition 5 more closely. Considering a second-price
auction, and assuming that the corruption scheme involves at most three
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players (the highest and the second-highest bidder and the auctioneer), we
found that revenue equivalence holds if n á 3 (Proposition 4). The reason
why this works is that in a symmetric equilibrium the bidder with a valuation
equal to zero will never receive a bribe because the third bid exceeds his own
with certainty; hence u∗(0) = 0. This is not true if n = 2. After all, with two
bidders there is no third bid, so the bribe condition requires only that the
losing bid be high enough. Under some parameter constellations, aggressive
bidding by the zero value bidder is indeed part of a symmetric equilibrium.
His probability of winning the auction is still zero, but he does always receive
a bribe in equilibrium, thus u∗(0) > 0, destroying revenue equivalence.
If more involved corruption schemes with arbitrarily large coalitions are fea-
sible, revenue equivalence can fail even if n á 3. In a k-price auction with
k > 1, every coalition that includes n−k+2 bidders drives the price down to
zero, and therefore a bidder with valuation equal to zero can force a positive
expected payoff by bidding aggressively enough, as demonstrated before for
n = 2, k = 2. If corruption succeeds to lower the price all the way down to
zero, the seller loses an extra chunk of revenue equal to nu∗(0). Therefore,
we conclude that the second-price auction is superior to third- and higher-
price auctions on the ground that smaller coalitions suffice to bring the price
down to zero in the higher-price auctions.
The argument does, however, not apply to the comparison of the first- and
second-price auction. Both auction forms require all n bidders to participate
in the corrupt coalition for revenue equivalence to fail. The second-price
auction, however, has an advantage over the first-price auction because it
rules out corrupt coalitions with only two members (the winner and the auc-
tioneer), to which the first-price auction is susceptible. We conclude that,
if corruption is an issue and an open-bid auction is not feasible, the seller
should choose a second-price sealed-bid auction.
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6. corruption-proof contracts
Corruption necessarily involves the auctioneer who acts as an agent on be-
half of the seller. In principle, the seller could avoid corruption by running
the auction himself or by setting up appropriate monitors. However, this
solution is often not feasible because the seller is not qualified for the task,
because ownership is diversified, or because the seller himself is an agent
for some other party, as in the case of the public sector. Yet, even in these
cases the seller can fight corruption by awarding the auctioneer an appro-
priate incentive contract. We now explain some properties of such incentive
schemes, using the example of a sealed-bid first-price auction.
Proposition 6 (corruption-proof incentive contract) Consider a sealed-
bid first-price auction. The seller can rule out corruption with a costless incen-
tive contract (s, s0) that offers the auctioneer a share s á 1− δδ∗ of the profit
in exchange for a flat fee s0.
Proof: The auctioneer’s compensation equals sb1 − s0. Set s0 := s
∫ 1
0 B1(x)
dF1(x), so that the contract is costless if β1 = B1.
The total surplus of the corrupt coalition equals the expected reduction of
the price paid to the seller, minus the expected penalty, minus the reduction
of the auctioneer’s compensation received from the seller,
S(b1, b2) := (1− δ)(b1 − b2)− δ(p0 + p1)− s(b1 − b2)
= (1− δ− s)(b1 − b2)− δ(p0 + p1).
We want to find conditions that guarantee that this surplus is not positive.
S reaches a maximum at b1 = β1(1) and b2 = β1(0). Therefore, S(β(v1),
β(v2)) à 0 for all v1, v2 if and only if
s á s∗ := 1− δ(β1(1)− β1(0)+ p0 + p1)
β1(1)− β1(0) .
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If s á s∗ the game collapses to the standard first-price auction without cor-
ruption. Thus, β1 = B1, and s∗ simplifies to






If δ < δ∗ then, by Corollary 3, there is a positive probability that corruption
will occur in equilibrium. But the seller may only have limited influence on the
detection probability and penalties because they are controlled by the legal
system. However, the seller can compensate the deficiency of the legal system
by offering the auctioneer an incentive compatible compensation scheme.
For instance, if the detection probability falls twenty percent short of the
smallest level that rules out corruption, i.e. δ = 0.8δ∗, it suffices to offer
the auctioneer a twenty percent profit share, s∗ = 0.2. With this contract,
S is non-positive and corruption is prevented at zero cost, and the expected
revenues are the same as in the standard first-price auction. We mention
that a similar condition for a corruption-proof compensation scheme can be
developed for second- and higher-price auctions.
Incidentally, linear sharing rules are commonly applied by major auction
houses. For example, Sotheby’s takes a profit share of 12% to 37%.5 Whether
this is meant to be a simple markup or an anti-corruption measure is open to
debate. In any case, such contracts reduce or even eliminate the incentives
to engage in the kind of corruption that we analyzed in the present paper.
5For live auctions at Sotheby’s salesrooms the buyer pays a commission of 10% to 20%
of the hammer price. For internet-auctions at sothebys.com the fee is 10% (called “buyer’s
premium”). In addition, buyers and sellers pay a commission between 2% and 20% of the
hammer prices of all purchases and sales within a calendar year (except sales by Sotheby’s
associates done over the internet). The seller also pays all agreed upon expenses (ship-
ping, insurance, taxes). The total fees (for non-associates), net of expenses, are therefore
10% to 20% buyer’s commission or premium, plus two times an amount between 2% and
20% of the hammer price. Thus, the fees collected by the auctioneer are between 14%
and 60% of the hammer price, or between 12.3% and 37.5% of the totally paid price (ham-
mer plus fees, net of expenses); see http://auction.sothebys.com/conditions.html,
section “Certain Conditions Relating to Buyers,” item 2 “Buyer’s Premium and Pay-
ment,” and http://auction.sothebys.com/auctionslive/sell.html, section “Stan-
dard Commission,” and personal communication with Sotheby’s customer assistance.
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7. conclusions
Our model establishes corruption as an equilibrium phenomenon of sealed-
bid auctions, if the seller delegates the actual conduct of the auction to an
auctioneer-agent. The model therefore explains the empirical fact that cor-
ruption does happen in public submissions and the like.
The model also shows that bidders do not benefit from corruption in terms of
equilibrium expected payoffs. The prospect of participating in a profitable
corruption scheme induces them to raise their bids to such an extent that
bidders’ entire surplus is competed away. Only the auctioneer-agent benefits
from it. This is a consequence of the revenue equivalence principle. The
entire cost of corruption, i.e. the excess profit of the auctioneer as well as
the expected value of punishment, is borne by the seller. Thus, the seller has
a strong interest to design and apply anti-corruption measures.
Such measures are available. All that is required is an appropriate incen-
tive contract between the seller and the auctioneer. We show that such an
incentive contract takes a simple form. It is just an ordinary linear profit
sharing contract, which, incidentally, is the standard form of contract used
by major auction houses, such as Sotheby’s. For this reason we conclude that
similar agreements should be used by government agencies for their public
submissions.
References
Cramton, P. C., Gibbons, R., and Klemperer, P. (1987). Dissolving a partner-
ship efficiently. Econometrica, 55, 615-632.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1994). Auctions with price-proportional benefits to
bidders. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 339-346.
17
Graham, D. A., and Marshall, R. C. (1987). Collusive bidder behavior at single–
object second–price and English auctions. Journal of Political Economy,
95, 1217-1239.
McAfee, R., and McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions and bidding. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 25, 699-738.
Wolfstetter, E. (1999). Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization,
Auctions, and Incentives. Cambridge University Press.
18
